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Abstract: 
The number of undocumented migrants in high income countries has increased in recent decades, 
imposing considerable political, fiscal and social pressures on governments. This has fostered discussions on 
whether and to what extent undocumented migrants should get access to public programs and public benefits. 
Looking at the 2012 Spanish health reform, this is the first paper to document the impacts of a restriction on 
access to the health care system for undocumented migrants on health care utilization, health care system 
perceptions and self-reported health in a high income country.  
We show that such restrictions may significantly reduce planned care for undocumented migrants and 
result in sharp fall in positive opinions about the health care services still left available to them. We also exploit 
the heterogeneity in implementing the policy across regions and report stronger effects in regions that enforced 
the national ban more fully. Furthermore, in the first three years since the implementation of the reform, we 
find suggestive evidence of a worsening in self-assessed health. This study is relevant for policymakers in the 
developed world, especially in countries which have recently implemented initiatives aimed at reducing the 
health care coverage for targeted groups, such as the UK and the US. 
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The number of people migrating to high income countries has surged in the last decades, a significant 
proportion of which does not have a legal status in the receiving country. Data from Eurostat reveals that 
618,780 non-EU citizens were found to be illegally residing in the EU in 2017, with Spain ranking in the top 
list of EU countries reporting the largest number of them (44,625), only after Germany (156,710), France 
(115,085), Greece (68,110), and the United Kingdom (54,910). 4 Furthermore, the flows of illegal immigrants 
to Spain are also increasing in recent years; data from Frontex (The European Border and Coast Guard 
Agency) shows that illegal border crossings on the Western Mediterranean sea (between Morocco and Spain) 
have increased significantly from 7,004 in 2015 to 9,990 in 2016, 23,063 in 2017 and 57,034 in 2018. For the 
case of the US, data from the PEW Research Centre states that 10.7 million unauthorized immigrants were 
living in the US in 2016. Increasing immigration pressures on high income countries have prompted some 
political parties to call for restrictions in access to public services and public benefits for immigrants as well 
as a stricter implementation of immigration regulations (Swain, 2019). 
In this context, to our knowledge, this paper is the first to present an evaluation of the impact of 
introducing restrictions in public services, specifically in health care, for undocumented immigrants on three 
main outcomes: health care utilization, user opinions about the system and self-assessed health. We exploit a 
reform introduced by the Spanish government in 2012 that prevented undocumented immigrants from 
accessing the public health care system, with the exception of hospital emergency services, pregnancy and 
birth and health care for children under 18 years old. Before the 2012 reform, the health care system in Spain 
was universal, which means that undocumented immigrants were entitled to full health care cover in the same 
conditions as the native population. 
Our study makes use of a unique quarterly dataset to investigate the impact of the implementation of 
this restriction on several health utilization outcomes, as well as on measures of health system perceptions--a 
parameter that is increasingly used as a health care system performance tool. We show that the reform resulted 
in important reductions in planned care for undocumented migrants, together with drops in the use of the 
emergency services. In addition, the results highlight a sharp fall in levels of overall positive opinions about 
the health care system, particularly with the emergency services–the only facility still accessible to 
undocumented immigrants. We also see that these effects are stronger in Spanish regions that implemented 
the national ban more fully as compared to regions that opted to introduce regional legislation to reduce its 
effects for the affected population. Furthermore, in the first three years following the implementation of the 
reform, we find suggestive evidence of a worsening trend in self-assessed health. These results have relevant 
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implications for policymakers in the industrialised world, especially in countries which have recently 
implemented initiatives aimed at reducing the health care coverage for the undocumented population, such as 
the UK (Keith & van Ginekken, 2015). Our results could also contribute to ongoing discussions in several 
high income countries on introducing restrictions in health care access for targeted sub-groups of the native 
population, the US being a particular example. 
We also add to the extensive and growing number of studies which explore the relationship between 
insurance cover, access to health care and self-assessed health, most importantly in the US (see e.g. Taubman 
et al., 2014; Currie & Gruber, 1996). For instance, a recent study on the effects of the expansion in health care 
coverage following the 2014 Affordable Care Act (Courtemanche et al., 2017), finds a significant increase in 
health care utilization after the reform, especially in regions which simultaneously implemented an expansion 
in the Medicaid programme. However, effects on self-reported health and risky health behaviour were less 
clear-cut.  
There is substantial evidence of a positive association between adult and infant health outcomes and 
an expansion of the health care system coverage both in country specific studies (most notably in the US), and 
in the analysis of large samples of countries over long time periods (for instance, Moreno-Serra, R., & Smith, 
P., 2015). However, while there is an extensive body of literature on the effects of expanding health insurance 
cover on utilization and health, and on health behaviours (e.g. Dave, Kaestner, and Wehby, 2019), fewer 
studies have focused on the impact of reducing coverage. An example of the latter is a recent paper by Tello-
Trillo (2018) which provides evidence of a substantial reduction in health care access and a worsening trend 
in self-reported health after the implementation of the 2005 Medicaid disenrollment reform affecting mainly 
childless adults in Tennessee in the US. Our study differs from this paper mainly in terms of our nation-wide 
scope rather than being limited to just one state or region and the policy target group in Spain being 
undocumented immigrants specifically. In parallel, the paper by Juanmartí et al. (2018) looks at the impact of 
the same Spanish reform on mortality rates of undocumented migrants and finds a significant increase (about 
16%) in the mortality rates of the affected population. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a background on the 2012 Spanish health care 
reform. Section 3 describes the data employed and section 4 discusses the empirical strategy. Section 5 
presents the main empirical results and the sensitivity analysis performed. The final section discusses the main 
policy implications and concludes. 
2. THE SPANISH HEALTH CARE REFORM 
The Spanish National Health Service provided universal coverage until 2012. It is tax funded and 
predominantly operates within the public sector. Since 2002, health care administration has been totally 
devolved to the regions (or Autonomous Communities) (Bernal Delgado et al., 2018). Prior to 2012, one of 
the major reforms in the health system involving immigrants was Act 4/2000, which granted full access to 
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health services regardless of nationality and legal status. The only prerequisite for non-Spaniards to receive 
the same health services as the native population was to register as a resident of a municipality. Evidence 
suggests that over time there has been a persistent increase in health inequality prejudicial to the immigrant 
population in Spain5. In particular, while immigrants start with a lower income-related inequality in health 
outcomes than the native population, such inequalities increase over time, converging to the national figures 
(Hernández-Quevedo & Jiménez-Rubio, 2009a; Gotsens et al., 2015).  
In April 2012, after four years of severe economic crisis in Spain, the government introduced a new 
law that changed the nature of the health care system. Several aspects of the health system were redefined, 
including the beneficiaries, its universality, the gratuitous nature of the services provided and other cost 
containment measures (Gallo & Gené-Badia, 2013). The 2012 law specifically linked entitlement with 
contribution to the system, thus excluding a large group of undocumented immigrants from receiving health 
care. Emergency, maternity and child care were the only services which undocumented immigrants were still 
able to use on the same terms as Spanish nationals.6  
 Recent reports have documented the existence of obstacles to health service access for groups of the 
population that were, theoretically, unaffected by the law, such as children. In some cases, undocumented 
individuals have also reported on being restricted from accessing emergency care (Nuño-Solinís, 2016). The 
new reform has also been accompanied by great confusion about the terms of the restrictions not only among 
the targeted population, but also among doctors and other stakeholders in the system.  
Another feature of the 2012 legislative change has been its uneven implementation across Spanish regions. 
Some regional authorities applied strong versions of the national health care ban (see Table 2). Others 
introduced alternative programs to still be able to provide access to the health care system to undocumented 
migrants in their regions, such as in the case of the Canary Islands, Andalusia and the Basque Country (Gallo 
and Gené-Badia, 2013) and may be less affected by the national ban. The region of Castile-La Mancha applied 
the nationwide regulations in full force without restrictions, while five regions applied the national ban with 




                                                          
5 Spain has recently witnessed an unprecedented increase in its foreign population. According to the 2007 National Immigrant 
Survey, 2.6 million Spanish households contain at least one person born abroad (INE, Spanish Institute of Statistics, 2008), although 
as a result of the recent economic downturn, the figures have remained stable: in 2011, Spain received 457,650 immigrants, a 
slightly lower number than in 2010 (465,169) (INE, 2016).  
6 At the same time, the government announced alternative health care plans for undocumented immigrants, which have since 




3. DATA  
We use very rich data from the Barómetro Sanitario, or the Spanish Health Barometer (later, SHB), which 
is a national survey that collects information on opinions, attitudes, utilization and perceptions of health 
services among a representative cross-section of the Spanish population, aged 18 and above. The Centre for 
Sociological Research has been conducting the survey three times a year since 1996, numbering a total sample 
of over 6,000 respondents per year. Data is collected by personal interview, and since households are selected 
randomly, respondents may include undocumented immigrants. We use data based on surveys conducted from 
2008 to 2015, however we note that information on two of the outcomes of interest (perceptions about 
emergency care and self-assessed health) were only included from 2010 onwards. In other words, for 
specifically these two outcomes, the relevant period included in our analysis is only from 2010-2015.  
For the purposes of this study, the post-reform period is taken as the time immediately following the 
implementation of the nationwide law, on 1 September 2012: Phase 3 of the 2012 survey, all the Phases of 
2013, 2014 and Phases 1 and 2 of 2015). The first pre-reform period is taken from the Phase 3 of the 2011 
survey and Phases 1 and 2 of 2012 (i.e., from 1 September 2011 to 1 September 2012) ; year 1 post-reform is 
described by Phase 3 in 2012 and Phases 1 and 2 in 2013 (i.e., from 1 September 2012 to 1 September 2013), 
and so on. The period after September 2015 is excluded from our analysis because legislative changes were 
made following the regional elections held in May, broadening the scope of the cover provided to the 
undocumented population in several of the regions which had been applying a stronger version of the 
nationwide legislation (Nuño-Solinís, 2016). 
The SHB provides information on health care utilization, health status and individual opinions about 
the health system in the last twelve months. In capturing utilization and opinions, questions refer to specific 
components of the health care system such as general practitioner (GP) visits, specialist visits, general hospital 
care and emergency care. Opinions about general and specific health care services are rated by both actual 
and potential users of public health services, on a scale from 1 (very unsatisfied) to 10 (very satisfied). As 
discussed previously, we focus mainly on opinions about emergency care services since these are the only 
services which all undocumented immigrants are theoretically entitled to use after the reform.7 The survey 
also includes a wide range of socioeconomic information (including age, gender, education, activity status and 
nationality). We generate an aggregate measure of planned health care use, designated as one if the individual 
has visited the GP, a specialist or a hospital, and zero if he/she has not visited any of these services. 
While the primary focus of the reform is health care utilization, a parameter that can be directly 
determined, the impact of the law on user perceptions about the health system, or on health status, is less 
                                                          
7 The exact question in the survey regarding the overall health system is: “In general, would you say that you are satisfied with 
the way in which the public health care system works in Spain?”. Regarding emergency care, the exact survey question is: “From 
your own experience or the idea that you have, I would like you to evaluate the following public health services”  
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straightforward. Taking a recent study (Fiorentini et al., 2017) reporting a strong correlation between objective 
and subjective opinions about health system responsiveness, we offer the conjecture that the 2012 reform may 
have had a negative effect on the perceived quality of care on the part of undocumented persons. However, it 
is also plausible that, in times of restricted access to health care, individual expectations may be lower (Gallo 
and Gené-Badía, 2013) and thus positive opinions about the health system may even increase as a result. With 
respect to health outcomes, access to health services could translate into healthy behaviour and status 
improvements via information and advice given by doctors (Courtemanche et al., 2017). On the other hand, 
access to health insurance could also worsen health outcomes by incentivising unhealthy behaviour, which 
may arise as a result of ex ante moral hazard or from pure income effects. Thus, from a theoretical point of 
view, the impact of the reform could be ambiguous, in terms of both health and satisfaction with the system.  
Similar to the few previous studies of undocumented immigrants in this context, direct information on 
the legal status of the individual is not available as this question is not included in the SHB survey. Thus, we 
adopt the approach from previous research in this field and assign documented or undocumented status to 
individuals according to their nationality (Amuedo-Dorantes & Lopez, 2005). Following this methodology, 
we calculate a proxy for each individual’s undocumented status using the 2011 Census to obtain information 
on the number of individuals of each nationality living in Spain one year before the introduction of the reform, 
and comparing this with the number of residence permits taken from the Ministry of Employment and Social 
Security in Spain. From this, we assign a status of “undocumented” to all individuals with a nationality that 
shows a positive number when we subtract the number of residence permits issued for a given nationality from 
the number of individuals from that same nationality indicated in the 2011 Census of Spain.8 The list of 
nationalities categorized as undocumented in our model can be found in Appendix Table 1A. Unlike the case 
of other surveys, our data enable us to identify individuals with double nationality, that is, the Spanish 
nationality and that of the individual’s country of origin. Thus, in our baseline data, our group of interest, or 
the treatment group, excludes those with double nationality. The control group includes all other nationalities 
not included in Annex Table 1A, Spanish citizens, and individuals with double nationality.  
We recognize that ours is not a perfect proxy. Of course, not all individuals with nationality from 
Appendix Table 1A will actually be undocumented. Some will have a residence permit and enjoy full legal 
status. However, given the extreme difficulty of assessing legal status at the individual level, we rely on a 
proxy variable. Therefore, individuals from these countries who may have legal status in Spain are also 
considered as part of the treatment group, i.e. subject to the health care ban. In consequence, our estimates 
represent a lower band of the true impact of the reform. That said, we also note that several NGOs and other 
organizations working in Spain have documented several cases of legal residents being denied access to the 
health care system after the reform (an example is illustrated in Appendix Figure 1A). In this way, our 
                                                          
8 This is a similar procedure to that of Gonzalez-Enriquez (2009) for the year 2008. 
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treatment variable may be a reliable proxy of the affected population, to a limited extent. In any case, we also 
test for robustness and explore the sensitivity of our results to changes in the definition of undocumented 
immigrant.  
4. METHODS 
We start our analysis by estimating the effects of the health care ban on health care utilization, health status 
and perceptions about the health system for the treatment group for all Spanish regions. Although the reform 
was implemented with varying levels of intensity across regions, we opt to analyze first at the national level 
to take into account that the affected population may not have been aware of the specificities introduced at the 
regional level. If this is the case, then we may observe a reduction in the utilization of health care for 
undocumented migrants in the entire territory. Furthermore, even if the undocumented population were aware 
of the regional differences in implementation of the policy, they may have regarded the use of the health care 
system as a risky endeavour, fearing the possibility of prosecution or even deportation, a phenomenon referred 
to as a “chilling effect” (Watson et al., 2014). Finally, there may also have been internal migration, with 
affected persons moving from regions that enforced the new law more fully to regions that implemented a 
softer version.  
We begin by estimating a simple Difference in Difference (DD) model in which the treatment group 
includes undocumented immigrants in Spain (as defined in the previous section). We look at their health 
outcomes before and after the application of the new law vis-a-vis the control group (also defined previously). 
This first DD specification can be summarised as follows: 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where UI is a dummy variable identifying whether individual “i” is an undocumented immigrant, as proxied 
by the country nationality of the individual “c”. Post is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the 
period of the third Survey Phase (“p”) of year 2012 (“y”) and for subsequent periods. Thus,  identifies the 
impact of the reform on undocumented immigrants in the country as a whole. The regression also includes 
region (at the level of Autonomous Communities) (“𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗") fixed effects, year fixed effects, “𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖”, and Survey 
Phase dummies “𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖” (three phases per year) as well as country of nationality fixed effects, “𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖”. We also 
include region-specific linear trends (𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 , at the level of Autonomous Communities) in order to 
capture any time-varying linear trend that may affect health care outcomes differently in each region (as there 
is some degree of decentralization to the regions, it can be the case that there are different trends across regions 





gender, and the regional unemployment rate9. For the health outcome models, self-reported health is collapsed 
into two categories: very bad and bad (assigned the value of 1); and medium, good and very good (assigned 
the value of 0). In all cases, estimations are based on linear probability models, standard errors are clustered 
by province (52) and sampling weights are used to make the sample as representative as possible of the Spanish 
population. As we are estimating several regressions, we adjust p values for the multiple hypothesis testing 
problem. Thus, we present our baseline results with p values using the conservative Sidak multiple correction 
test in parenthesis (Abdi, 2007: Sidak, 1967). Adjusted p values are in general similar to unadjusted ones (see 
supplementary online Appendix, Tables 4A-6A). 
As mentioned above, some regional authorities tried to pass local laws granting access to their regional 
health care system to undocumented migrants. These regional laws were introduced at different points in time 
after the national legislation (see Table 2). Therefore, we divide the regions into those that we considered were 
more “intensively treated” (applied the national health care ban; Madrid, Murcia, Balearic Islands, Rioja, 
Castilla-Leon, Castilla-La Mancha) and those that were “less intensively treated” (introduced regional laws to 
still be able to provide access to health care for undocumented migrants; Andalusia, Asturias, Aragón, Canary 
Islands, Cantabria, Catalonia, Basque Country, Extremadura, Galicia, Valencia, Navarra). We consider the 
regions as belonging to each group during the entire period. The more intensively treated regions represent 
32.6% of the observations in our sample and 29.8% of the population in Spain in 2012 whereas the less 
intensively treated regions represent 67.3% of the observations in our sample and 69.8% of the population in 
Spain in 2012. We estimate the same DD model as in the first case but separately, one for the more intensively 
treated regions and another, for those designated as less intensively treated.  
The validity of the DD estimator relies on the existence of “parallel or common trends”. In our case, this 
means that, allowing for initial differences, health status and health care use patterns in the control group 
should be a valid counterfactual for what would have occurred to health-related outcomes in the treatment 
group if the reform had not been applied. While on theoretical grounds there is no reason to believe that 
patterns in the treatment and control groups differed before the 2012 reform, further study is needed to 
formally test the parallel trends assumption, by means of an event study model. This model includes 
interactions between pre-reform dummy variables with the treatment group in order to assess the differences 
in the outcome variables between these two groups in the years before the policy was implemented. Table 2A 
shows the results of the event study models for the variables that are significant in the baseline models (results 
for the rest of outcome variables are provided in online supplementary Appendix Tables 1A-3A). We show 
the results for the models including all regions as well as for the models considering only the more/less 
intensively treated regions. The results of the pre-reform interaction analysis of these dummy variables show 
                                                          
9 Group dummies (18-35 years – the reference category – and 35-45, 45-65, 65-75 and >75 years), dummies for the level of education 
(no qualification – the reference category, including individuals with less than five years’ school education – secondary or pre-
university studies and higher education), gender as well as regional level controls such as the unemployment rate of the region.  
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convincing evidence that the parallel trend assumption is met, as most of the coefficients for the pre-reform 
dummies are insignificant.  
5. RESULTS 
According to the descriptive statistics shown in Table 1 for the pre-reform period, there are some 
differences in the health-related variables between undocumented and documented individuals. These 
differences are very much in line with those reported in the previous literature. In general, undocumented 
immigrants are healthier and have a more positive opinion about the health system than individuals in the 
control group in both more and less intensively treated regions. Regarding other socioeconomic factors, 
undocumented immigrants are generally younger in both types of regions. These features are in line with the 
‘healthy immigrant’ effect literature, according to which there is a positive selection of immigrants, that they 
are in better health than the native population, although the comparative advantage seems to decrease over 
time (McDonald and Kennedy, 2004; Farré, 2016). 
We believe that these differences between the documented and the undocumented do not pose a threat 
to our identification as, under the assumption that these differences are constant over time, our DD model will 
be correctly estimated. Figures 1 and 2 plot the raw data on aggregated planned health care utilization for the 
treated and the control group in more intensively treated regions from 2008 (five years before the 
implementation of the policy) to 2015 (three years after its implementation). Figure 1 seems to indicate a 
strong drop in planned health care utilization for undocumented migrants in more intensively treated regions 
after the reform. Figure 2 shows that there seems to be no significant change in planned health care use for 
the control group in these regions. Of course, these figures provide only descriptive evidence and do not imply 
causal effects of the policy; clearly, other aspects may have affected the outcomes of interest. In the next part 
of this analysis, we examine the results of the econometric model, which includes region, country of 
nationality fixed effects, time fixed effects, survey phase fixed effects and region-specific linear trends as well 
as controls for individual characteristics in order to isolate the causal impact of the policy on health care 
utilization, self-assessed health and user perceptions about health care services.   
We begin by estimating the results for the outcome variables including all Spanish regions in the 
regression. In Table 3 we show that, after the reform, undocumented migrants have lower probabilities of 
visiting the GP, are less likely to use the emergency room, of having a visit for planned care (GP, specialist 
and hospital visits altogether) and have lower satisfaction measures. However, none of these negative effects 
are significant at any level. In the last column, we see a significant increase in the probability of reporting bad 
health for the treated group after the reform. As the baseline levels of bad health are quite low in the group of 
undocumented migrants, the reform increased the probability of having bad health by approximately 160%, a 
rather large effect.  
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In order to take into account inter-regional differences in the implementation of the law, which 
generated another dimension of heterogeneity, we perform separate estimations, depending on the intensity of 
the implementation, to better identify the size of the policy effects. As mentioned, we classify the regions 
between two groups, those that were more intensively treated (stronger implantation of the law) and those that 
were less intensively treated. We compare utilization and satisfaction outcomes for the treated and control 
groups in more intensively treated regions (Table 4) and in less intensively treated regions (Table 5).  
Table 4 shows that most of the coefficients are larger in magnitude and become highly significant. 
Specifically, undocumented migrants have a lower probability of visiting the GP which dropped by 8.1% 
while the probability of visiting a specialist declined by 25.7% for undocumented migrants after the reform. 
Furthermore, hospital visits dropped by 36.4%. The positive opinions about the health care system also fell 
significantly. Satisfaction with the health services was reduced by 2.9% and positive opinions about the 
emergency care services dropped by 9.7%. When we estimate the results using a sample restricted to only 
users of the health care system (which are not reported but are available upon request), the results of the 
measures of perception of the health care system are similar in terms of signs although, for the more intensively 
treated regions, the coefficients for positive opinions about the health services and about the emergency 
services are further reduced so that the negative impacts become larger.  
 The coefficient for self-assessed health is positive, suggesting a deterioration of the health status of 
the affected population, but in this specification it is not statistically significant.   
Estimating the same model for the less intensively treated regions, we see in Table 5 that most of the 
coefficients are much smaller in size and insignificant, with the exception of visits to the emergency 
department (a reduction by 19.2%) as well as worsening in self-assessed health measure (an increase in bad 
health by 287%). Although those regions tried to introduce some regional legislation to counterbalance the 
national law, it is important to note that coverage was not immediately restored (as there was a time lag 
between the national and the regional laws) and coverage was only partially (and not fully restored) restored 
in many of the less intensively treated regions.  
With these results, we find evidence of strong negative impacts on health care utilization as well as on 
opinions about the health system and self-assessed health for undocumented migrants because of the 
introduction of the health care ban in 2012. These effects are stronger in the more intensively treated regions. 
In the next section we test our results for robustness.  
6. TESTS OF ROBUSTNESS 
In order to test the robustness of our results we perform two placebo exercises in which we assign treatment 
status to two groups of the population which are arguably untreated by the reform. The first “fake” treatment 
group consists of persons with a nationality from the European Union (EU). These individuals should not be 
11 
 
substantially affected by the policy change as their European Union nationality would entitle them to access 
the health care system under the same conditions than any other Spanish citizen. Following the 2012 reform, 
EU citizens were additionally requested to present a consular certificate to be able to access health care 
services in the same terms as any Spanish citizen.  However, according to the only qualitative document that 
provides some anecdotic evidence on the exclusion cases across Spain (REDER, 2017), there are some cases 
of EU citizens being excluded from health care. That is why we believe the results of our second “fake” 
treatment group, which includes individuals with a double nationality (Spanish nationality and another one), 
might be more reliable.   
In both exercises, the control group is left unchanged so that it is the same as in our baseline regressions. 
Details of the estimation results for the two fake treatment groups and for all our outcome variables are shown 
in the Appendix section for the model including all Spanish regions (Table 3A), the model including only the 
more intensively treated regions (Table 4A) and the less intensively treated regions (Table 5A). Columns 
labelled as DN refer to the results using as the fake treatment group those individuals with double nationality 
whereas columns labelled as EU refer to the results using as the fake treatment group those individuals with 
an EU nationality.  
As expected, none of the coefficients are negative and significant, reinforcing the causal interpretation of our 
baseline estimates. As mentioned before, though, some of the EU individuals might have also been denied 
access to the public health care system (as reported by some NGO’s) and that could explain that the only 
positive sign that we find in these placebo tests is for emergency visits in more intensively treated regions.  
As the questions in the survey about health care utilization and health system perception measures refer to the 
situation in the previous 12 months, we put proportional weights to the post-reform variable according to the 
exposure time to the reform in each wave. Thus, the “post” dummy variable takes the value of 0.4 for the 
period of the third Survey Phase of year 2012, 0.6 for the first period of 2013, 0.8 for the second period of 
2013 and 1 from the third period of 2013 to the subsequent periods. The results are in Tables 6A, 7A and 8A. 
We can see that results are very similar to the baseline ones reported in Tables 3, 4 and 5, though the size of 
the coefficients are slightly bigger in the regressions with weights on the post reform variable.  
Finally, we use as treatment variable the percentage of undocumented in any given nationality shown in Table 
1A. Thus, instead of using a binary treatment indicator (which equals 1 for all the nationalities with a positive 
percentage of undocumented in Spain in 2011), we use the continuous number that represents the percentage 
of undocumented individuals for each nationality in Spain in 2011. We can see that the results (Tables 9A for 
all Spanish regions, 10A for more intensively treated regions and 11A for less intensively treated regions) are 
somewhat similar than our baseline results in terms of signs and significance levels of the coefficients, 
although a small number of coefficients become insignificant when using the continuous treatment variable 
(such as bad health for the regression for all Spain and hospital visits and positive opinions about the health 
care services for the regressions in more intensively treated regions). Of course, the point estimates of the 
coefficients are different because the treatment variable is no longer a dummy variable but a continuous 
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variable. We decide to use the binary treatment variable as our baseline results for one main reason: the 
percentage of undocumented by nationality is probably measured with error and we, therefore, label as treated 
all individuals potentially affected by the reform (because they have undocumented persons of their nationality 
in Spain). 
In any case, the results of all these robustness tests provide further evidence about the credibility of our 
identification strategy and about the plausibility of our baseline estimates. 
 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
In this study, we examine the effects of a 2012 legal reform that restricted access to the health care 
system for undocumented immigrants in Spain. We evaluate the effect of this reform on several indicators of 
health care utilization, on the level of positive opinions about the health system and on self-assessed health 
status using a difference-in-difference specification that compares the outcomes of undocumented migrants 
(as proxied by nationals of countries with undocumented migrants in Spain in 2011) to the control group 
(which includes Spanish citizens as well as citizens from other countries with no undocumented migrants in 
Spain in 2011).  
In the first stage of the analysis, we considered the effects of the reform on all undocumented 
immigrants in Spain vis-à-vis the unaffected population. Our results show reductions in most of the health 
care utilization variables (although the coefficients are not significant) as well as a significant deterioration of 
the undocumented migrants’ self-assessed health. Then, we split the sample into those belonging to either the 
more or the less intensively treated regions on the basis of how strictly they complied with the nationwide 
ban. According to our results, restricting access to the health care system for undocumented immigrants had 
a stronger effect on utilization and health system perception variables in highly treated regions; GP visits were 
reduced by 8.1%, specialist visits dropped by 25.7% and hospital visits plummeted by 36.4%. Positive 
perceptions about the health services fell by 2.9% and about the emergency services dropped by 9.7%. In less 
intensively treated regions, we observe a decrease in hospital emergency visits (a result which may support 
the “chilling effect” hypothesis previously found in earlier studies (see e.g. Watson, 2014), as well as a 
substantial deterioration of self-assessed health.  
In this paper, we have been able to provide evidence of adverse health related effects in the first three 
years after the implementation of the reform. Our results, combined with previous studies, particularly by 
Juanmartí et al. (2018) that restricting access to health care leads to higher mortality rates for undocumented 
migrants, may imply an increased possibility of additional non-negligible negative health impacts in the near 
future arising from lower health care utilization we have seen in this paper. In addition, our study provides 
indicative evidence that, as shown in the literature, there is a strong correlation between measures of self-
reported health and mortality (Jylhä, 2011). The lack of access to preventive services may impose huge costs 
on society, given the negative externalities generated by contagious diseases, for instance, but which we are 
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not able to evaluate with the database used in this study. Finally, restricting access to services according to 
nationality usually requires complex administrative procedures and is highly opposed by many health 
professionals who have declared themselves against this initiative (Nuño-Solinís, 2016). 
Additionally, our findings of lower levels of positive opinions about the emergency care department 
post-reform may reinforce those of Fiorentini et al. (2017), who recorded a strong association between 
subjective and objective measures of health care satisfaction. Therefore, we corroborate previous findings that 
patients’ self-reported measures can be considered valid predictors of more objective measures of 
responsiveness and could be used as tools to evaluate the performance of health systems. 
One of the first measures of the new government that took office in July 2018 in Spain was to restore 
universal health coverage to immigrants who are able to prove to have resided for more than 90 days in the 
country. However, no formal procedure has been established to assess the impact of this new policy, and 
monitoring compliance with the new measure is important in order to avoid long-term health and other social 
costs. The results of our study may offer a cautionary tale for policymakers not only in Spain, but also in other 
countries considering the introduction of restrictions on access to health services for the immigrant population. 
These findings may also be relevant for the United Kingdom, which introduced an up-front surcharge to access 
NHS hospitals for people from outside the European Economic Area in 2015 –which has recently been 
doubled claiming this would produce savings on NHS resources and deter health tourism. To the authors’ 
knowledge, the impacts of this policy on health, utilization trends, satisfaction with services or other more 
general socio economic aspects such as immigration in the UK labour market and immigration status itself 
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Figure 1. Proportion of planned Health Care Visits for treated (undocumented) individuals. More 
intensively treated regions. 
 
Planned Health Care visits: Aggregated visits to the GP, Specialist and Hospital services. 
 
Figure 2. Proportion of planned Health Care Visits for control (documented) individuals. More 
intensively treated Spanish regions. 
 
 















































































Table 1. Descriptive statistics (2008-2012, pre reform period). 
 Less treated regions More treated regions 
Use variables Documented Undocumented Diff p val Documented Undocumented 
Diff p 
val 
Prob. GP visit 0.689 0.706 0.179 0.674 0.738 0.002 
Prob. Specialist visits 0.374 0.292 0.000 0.387 0.350 0.086 
Prob. Hospital visit 0.086 0.093 0.508 0.085 0.140 0.000 
Prob. Planned visit  0.728 0.735 0.693 0.714 0.762 0.017 
Prob. Emergency 
visits 0.292 0.387 0.000 0.260 0.364 0.000 
Positive Opinion about health services and Health variables       
Positive opinion 
health system 6.425 7.136 0.000 6.617 7.451 0.000 
Positive opinion 
emergency services 6.074 6.392 0.006 6.074 6.775 0.000 
Bad Health 0.050 0.008 0.002 0.040 0.013 0.017 
Socioeconomic variables            
No studies 0.027 0.012 0.0140 0.025 0.007  0.0110 
Primary education 0.231 0.134 0.0000 0.223 0.136  0.0000 
Secondary education 0.517 0.713 0.0000 0.506 0.683  0.0000 
University  0.168 0.132 0.0129 0.200 0.153  0.0081 
Female 0.491 0.510 0.3339 0.496 0.458  0.0866 
Male  0.509 0.490 0.3339 0.504 0.542  0.0866 
Regional 
unemployment rate 18.545 17.917 0.0000 17.013 16.346  0.0029 
18-35 years old 0.288 0.558 0.0000 0.288 0.570  0.0000 
35-45 years old 0.199 0.284 0.0000 0.202 0.248  0.0104 
45-65 years old 0.303 0.143 0.0000 0.296 0.169  0.0000 
65-75 years old 0.117 0.012 0.0000 0.117 0.011  0.0000 
> 75 years old 0.093 0.003 0.0000 0.097 0.002  0.0000 
N  23,917 690   10,215 537   
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Table 3. Difference-in-Differences: health care utilization variables. Impact on undocumented 




















     
    
After  0.027 -0.056 0.002 0.014 0.002 0.056 -0.130 -0.005 
  (0.97) (0.43) (0.98) (0.74) (0.98) (0.97) (0.95) (0.97) 
Undocumented*After -0.025 0.004 -0.006 -0.021 -0.055 -0.084 -0.213 0.016** 
  (0.46) (0.97) (0.97) (0.77) (0.14) (0.77) (0.70) (0.05) 
         
Constant 1.209*** -0.026 0.077* 1.117*** 0.355*** 9.734*** 6.798*** 0.069* 
 (0.00) (0.56) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) 
Nationality Fixed 
Effects X X X X X X X X 
Region FE X X X X X X X X 
Time FE X X X X X X X X 
Region linear trends X X X X X X X X 
Individual Covariates X X X X X X X X 
Pre-reform mean 
outcome variable 0.721 0.318 0.114 0.748 0.376 7.281 6.577 0.010 
% Impact of the policy     
 
  160% 
Observations 54,351 54,338 54,546 54,591 54,505 54,142 37,928 40,588 
R-squared 0.042 0.045 0.012 0.048 0.018 0.072 0.064 0.046 
 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level, Sidak p-values adjusted for multiple testing are shown in parenthesis. 
The regression also includes survey phase dummies (three per year). Individual covariates include dummies for age groups, dummies 
for highest level of education, gender and the level of regional unemployment.  






Table 4. Difference-in-Differences: health care utilization variables. Impact on undocumented 
immigrants in more intensively treated Spanish regions. 
  
















     
    
After  -0.041 -0.117 0.030 -0.043 -0.108* -0.064 -0.201 0.025 
  (0.91) (0.67) (0.67) (0.67) (0.31) (0.91) (0.80) (0.22) 
Undocumented*After -0.060* -0.090*** -0.051*** -0.057** -0.025 -0.219* -0.658*** 0.007 
  (0.08) (0.00) (0.01) (0.05) (0.62) (0.06) (0.00) (0.62) 
         
Constant 1.155*** 0.339*** 0.109*** 1.149*** 0.019 10.467*** 5.358*** 0.041 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.61) (0.00) (0.00) (0.19) 
Nationality Fixed 
Effects X X X X X X X X 
Region FE X X X X X X X X 
Time FE X X X X X X X X 
Region linear trends X X X X X X X X 
Individual Covariates X X X X X X X X 
Pre-reform mean 
outcome variable 0.738 0.350 0.140 0.762 0.364 7.451 6.775 0.013 
% Impact of the policy -8.1% -25.7% -36.4% -7.5%  -2.9% -9.7%  
Observations 17,711 17,709 17,763 17,775 17,746 17,611 12,300 13,264 
R-squared 0.045 0.047 0.016 0.052 0.019 0.059 0.061 0.036 
 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level, Sidak p-values adjusted for multiple testing are shown in parenthesis. 
The regression also includes survey phase dummies (three per year). Individual covariates include dummies for age groups, dummies 
for highest level of education, gender and the level of regional unemployment.  





Table 5. Difference-in-Differences: health care utilization variables. Impact on undocumented 
immigrants in less intensively treated Spanish regions. 
  
















     
    
After  0.031 -0.053 0.000 0.016 0.028 -0.003 -0.104 -0.010 
  (0.96) (0.67) (1.00) (0.89) (0.96) (1.00) (0.96) (0.88) 
Undocumented*After -0.002 0.072 0.025 0.005 -0.074* 0.016 0.062 0.023** 
  (1.00) (0.52) (0.94) (1.00) (0.09) (1.00) (1.00) (0.02) 
         
Constant 0.138*** 0.837*** 0.060** 1.111*** 0.333*** 6.741*** 6.973*** 0.059 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) 
Nationality Fixed 
Effects X X X X X X X X 
Region FE X X X X X X X X 
Time FE X X X X X X X X 
Region linear trends X X X X X X X X 
Individual Covariates X X X X X X X X 
Pre-reform mean 
outcome variable 0.708 0.293 0.094 0.737 0.385 7.149 6.416 0.008 
% Impact of the policy     -19.2%   287% 
Observations 36,619 36,607 36,761 36,794 36,737 36,509 25,615 27,310 
R-squared 0.044 0.048 0.013 0.048 0.019 0.077 0.068 0.054 
 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level, Sidak p-values adjusted for multiple testing are shown in parenthesis. 
The regression also includes survey phase dummies (three per year). Individual covariates include dummies for age groups, dummies 
for highest level of education, gender and the level of regional unemployment. 






Table 1 A. Nationality of undocumented immigrants (2011). 
 






Saudi Arabia 0.5710 
Liberia 0.5683 






Costa Rica 0.4880 
Nepal 0.4782 




















Cape Verde 0.2593 
Korea, South 0.2585 
Senegal 0.2434 
Benin 0.2427 

































Source: Own calculation following the methodology of González-Enriquez (2009). The categorization of undocumented 
immigrants is based  on the number of individuals from a given nationality living in Spain in 2011 (as reported in the 
2011 census) and the number of individuals of that nationality that have a legal residence permit to leave in Spain 
based on Spanish Ministry of Employment and Social Security. 
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Table 2A. Estimations with pre-reform dummies. 

























                     
After -0.005 After -0.041 -0.116 0.029 -0.043 -0.056 -0.201 After -0.102 -0.010 
 (0,99)   (0,95) (0,69) (0,76) (0,95) (0,95) (0,89)   (0,99) (0,90) 
4yearsbefore*  4yearsbefore* -0.014 -0.089 0.070 -0.002 -0.187   4yearsbefore*   
Undocumented  Undocumented (0,96) (0,18) (0,37) (0,97) (0,77)   Undocumented   
3yearsbefore*  3yearsbefore* 0.098* -0.019 0.051 0.089 0.100   3yearsbefore*   
Undocumented  Undocumented (0,08) (0,89) (0,31) (0,12) (0,89)   Undocumented   
2yearsbefore* -0.023 2yearsbefore* -0.029 0.034 0.067 0.008 0.009 0.319 2yearsbefore* -0.226 -0.019 
Undocumented (0,33) Undocumented (0,97) (0,97) (0,57) (0,99) (0,99) (0,97) Undocumented (0,25) (0,15) 
1yearbefore* -0.032 1yearbefore* 0.024 0.023 0.003 0.007 -0.196 -0.109 1yearbefore* 0.204 -0.023 
Undocumented (0,26) Undocumented (0,98) (0,96) (0,99) (0,99) (0,96) (0,99) Undocumented (0,34) (0,11) 
Undocumented* -0.003 Undocumented* -0.039 -0.103* -0.008 -0.032 -0.274 ?-0.585 Undocumented* 0.050 0.008 
After (0,58) After (0,74) (0,07) (0,80) (0,74) (0,53) (0,37) After (0,77) (0,84) 
Constant 0.088** Constant 0.622*** 0.339*** 0.106*** 1.125*** 6.492*** 4.741*** Constant 4.270*** 0.056 




Effects X X X X X X 
Nationality Fixed 
Effects X X 
Region FE X Region FE X X X X X X Region FE X X 
Time FE X Time FE X X X X X X Time FE X X 
Region linear trends X Region linear trends X X X X X X Region linear trends X X 
Individual Covariates X Individual Covariates X X X X X X Individual Covariates X X 
Observations 40,588 Observations 17,732 17,731 17,785 17,797 17,633 12,313 Observations 25,615 27,310 
R-squared 0.046 R-squared 0.043 0.043 0.014 0.049 0.059 0.061 R-squared 0.068 0.054 
 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level, Sidak p-values adjusted for multiple testing are shown in parenthesis. The regression also includes survey phase dummies (three per year). 
Individual covariates include dummies for age groups, dummies for highest level of education, gender and the level of regional unemployment. 
 




Table 3A. Estimates for alternative definitions of undocumented individuals (Placebo tests) in all Spanish regions. 
 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level, Sidak p-values adjusted for multiple testing are shown in parenthesis. The regression also includes survey phase dummies (three per year). 
Individual covariates include dummies for age groups, dummies for highest level of education, gender and the level of regional unemployment.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
DN: Double Nationality individuals 




GP visits Specialist visits Hospital  visits All planned care Hosp. Emergency visits 
 Positive opinion 
Health Serv. 
Positive opinion 
Emerg. Care Bad Health 
  
 DN EU DN EU DN EU DN EU DN EU DN EU DN EU DN EU 
After  0.026 0.028 -0.055 -0.056 0.002 0.001 0.014 0.015 0.001 0.001 0.066 0.048 -0.139 -0.131 -0.004 -0.005 
 (1.00) (0.99) (0.41) (0.44) (1.00) (0.99) (1.00) (0.99) (1.00) (0.99) (1.00) (0.99) (0.96) (0.97) (1.00) (0.99) 
Undocumented* 
After 
-0.056 -0.057 0.069 -0.011 0.046 0.017 -0.052 -0.036 -0.019 0.093 -0.180 0.010 0.435 -0.079 -0.004 -0.016 
























 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.44) (0.75) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.09) (0.56) 
Nationality FE X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Region FE X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Time FE X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Region linear trends X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Individual Covariates X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
                 
 
Observations 54,351 54,351 54,338 54,338 54,546 
54,54
6 54,591 54,591 54,505 54,505 54,142 54,142 37,928 37,928 40,588 
40,58
8 
R-squared 0.045 0.043 0.048 0.046 0.014 0.013 0.051 0.048 0.021 0.019 0.076 0.073 0.067 0.065 0.050 0.046 
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Table 4A. Estimates for alternative definitions of undocumented individuals (Placebo test) in more intensively treated Spanish regions. 
  
GP visits Specialist visits Hospital  visits All planned care Hosp. Emergency visits  Positive opinion Health Serv. 
Positive opinion 
Emerg. Care Bad Health 
  
 DN EU DN EU DN EU DN EU DN EU DN EU DN EU DN EU 
After  -0.043 -0.042 -0.109 -0.118 0.022 0.027 -0.040 -0.045 -0.099* -0.116** 0.000 -0.067 -0.235 -0.210 0.031** 0.023* 
 (0.96) (0.94) (0.69) (0.65) (0.88) (0.79) (0.96) (0.94)  (0.41) (0.28) (1.00) (0.94) (0.88) (0.87) (0.08) (0.30) 
Undocumented*After 
-0.031 0.025 0.053 -0.018 0.106 0.016 -0.050 0.017 0.007 0.153** -0.054 -0.034 0.586 -0.209 -0.048 0.000 
(0.83) (1.00) (0.73) (1.00) (0.49) (1.00) (0.73) (1.00) (0.98) (0.02) (0.98) (1.00) (0.45) (0.98) (0.73) (1.00) 
Constant 0.608*** 1.642*** 0.004 0.917*** -0.119 0.013 0.502*** 1.363*** -0.255*** -0.179*** 12.923*** 9.935*** 7.120*** 6.634*** 0.041 0.041* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.96) (0.00) (0.30) (0.41) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.30) (0.17) 
Nationality Fixed 
Effects X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Region FE X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Time FE X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Region linear trends X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Individual covariates 
Observations                         17,732 17,732 17,732 17,731 17,731 17,785 17,785 17,797 17,797 
17,768 17,768 17,633 17,633 12,313 12,313 13,278  
R-squared 0.049 0.044 0.048 0.044 0.016 0.014 0.056 0.051 0.023 0.019 0.066 0.060 0.065 0.062 0.039 0.032 
         
        
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level, Sidak p-values adjusted for multiple testing are shown in parenthesis. The regression also includes survey phase dummies (three per year). 
Individual covariates include dummies for age groups, dummies for highest level of education, gender and the level of regional unemployment.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
DN: Double Nationality individuals 






Table 5A. Estimates for alternative definitions of undocumented individuals (Placebo test) in less intensively treated Spanish regions. 
  
GP visits Specialist visits Hospital  visits All planned care Hosp. Emergency visits 
 Positive opinion 
Health Serv. 
Positive opinion 
Emerg. Care Bad Health   
 DN EU DN EU DN EU DN EU DN EU DN EU DN EU DN EU 
After  0.028 0.031 -0.053 -0.050 0.002 0.001 0.013 0.017 0.025 0.025 0.002 -0.004 -0.181* -0.101 -0.006 -0.009 
 (0.99) (0.99) (0.62) (0.69) (1.00) (1.00) (0.99) (0.99) (0.99) (0.99) (1.00) (1.00) (0.99) (0.99) (0.91) (0.91) 
Undocumented*After 
-0.070 -0.036 0.116 0.020 0.025 0.021 -0.046 -0.005 0.007 0.074 -0.128 -0.053 0.623 -0.059 0.017 -0.002 
(0.094) (0.054) (0.087) (0.033) (0.041) (0.027) (0.078) (0.049) (0.063) (0.044) (0.380) (0.185) (0.510) (0.413) (0.026) (0.026) 
Constant 0.518*** 0.532*** 0.454*** 1.648*** -0.042 0.002 0.513*** 0.483*** 0.128* 0.133*** 8.356*** 8.507*** 5.294*** 9.676*** 0.025 0.036 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.64) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.50) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.64)  (0.49) 
Nationality Fixed 
Effects X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Region FE X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Time FE X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Region linear trends X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X 
Individual covariates 
 
               
Observations 36,574 36,574 36,564 36,564 36,715 36,715 36,747 36,747 36,691 36,691 36,463 36,463 25,582 25,582 27,276 27,276 
R-squared 0.051 0.048 0.058 0.056 0.019 0.017 0.057 0.055 0.024 0.021 0.082 0.079 0.071 0.069 0.064 0.061 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level, Sidak p-values adjusted for multiple testing are shown in parenthesis. The regression also includes survey phase dummies (three per year). 
Individual covariates include dummies for age groups, dummies for highest level of education, gender and the level of regional unemployment.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
DN: Double Nationality individuals 




Table 6A. Weighted year of treatment estimates in all Spanish regions 
  
















          
After  -0.003 -0.022 -0.014 -0.013 0.015 -0.218*** -0.240 -0.001 
 (0.98) (0.45) (0.41) (0.28) (0.79) (0.01) (0.16) (0.98) 
Undocumented*After -0.029 -0.001 -0.010 -0.024 -0.064 -0.073 -0.069 0.016 
  (0.53) (0.99) (0.99) (0.87) (0.12) (0.93) (0.99) (0.16) 
Constant 1.198*** 0.007 0.079** 1.106*** 0.357*** 9.672*** 6.860*** 0.077*** 
 (0.00) (0.91) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Nationality Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X 
Region FE X X X X X X X X 
Time FE X X X X X X X X 
Region linear trends X X X X X X X X 
Individual Covariates X X X X X X X X 
Pre-reform mean 
outcome variable 0.721 0.318 0.114 0.748 0.376 7.281 6.577 0.010 
 
       
Observations 54,351 54,338 54,546 54,591 54,505 54,142 37,928 40,588 
R-squared 0.042 0.045 0.012 0.048 0.018 0.072 0.064 0.046 
 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level, Sidak p-values adjusted for multiple testing are shown in parenthesis. The regression also includes survey phase dummies (three per 
year). Individual covariates include dummies for age groups, dummies for highest level of education, gender and the level of regional unemployment 





Table 7A. Weighted year of treatment estimates for more intensively treated Spanish regions  
  
















          
After  -0.070** 0.050 -0.044 -0.031 -0.030 -0.165 0.377 -0.011 
 (0.09) (0.19) (0.58) (0.83) (0.69) (0.83) (0.69) (0.83) 
Undocumented*After -0.065* -0.119*** -0.071*** -0.059** -0.051 -0.215* -0.672*** 0.005 
  (0.07) (0.00) (0.01) (0.03) (0.49) (0.07) (0.00) (0.49) 
Constant 1.169*** 0.385*** 0.111*** 1.158*** 0.074** 10.453*** 5.568*** 0.012 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.59) 
Nationality Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X 
Region FE X X X X X X X X 
Time FE X X X X X X X X 
Region linear trends X X X X X X X X 
Individual Covariates X X X X X X X X 
Pre-reform mean 
outcome variable 0,738 0,350 0,140 0,762 0,364 7,451 6,775 0,013 
        
Observations 17,732 17,731 17,785 17,797 17,768 17,633 12,313 13,278 
R-squared 0.043 0.043 0.014 0.049 0.018 0.059 0.060 0.031 
 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level, Sidak p-values adjusted for multiple testing are shown in parenthesis. The regression also includes survey phase dummies (three per 
year). Individual covariates include dummies for age groups, dummies for highest level of education, gender and the level of regional unemployment. 





Table 8A. Weighted year of treatment estimates for less intensively treated Spanish regions  
  














          
After  -0.002 -0.036 -0.009 -0.018 0.026 -0.304*** -0.314** 0.001 
 (0.99) (0.25) (0.67) (0.25) (0.50) (0.00) (0.03) (0.99) 
Undocumented*After -0.004 0.081 0.031 0.004 -0.073 0.036 0.290 0.024* 
  (0.99) (0.58) (0.84) (0.99) (0.14) (0.99) (0.58) (0.08) 
Constant 0.118** 0.859*** 0.057** 1.096*** 0.324*** 6.660*** 6.879*** 0.079** 
 (0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) 
Nationality Fixed Effects X X X X X X X X 
Region FE X X X X X X X X 
Time FE X X X X X X X X 
Region linear trends X X X X X X X X 
Individual Covariates X X X X X X X X 
Pre-reform mean 
outcome variable 0.708 0.293 0.094 0.737 0.385 7.149 6.416 0.008 
 
       
Observations 36,619 36,607 36,761 36,794 36,737 36,509 25,615 27,310 
R-squared 0.043 0.048 0.013 0.048 0.019 0.077 0.068 0.054 
 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level, Sidak p-values adjusted for multiple testing are shown in parenthesis. The regression also includes survey phase dummies (three per 
year). Individual covariates include dummies for age groups, dummies for highest level of education, gender and the level of regional unemployment. 






Table 9A. Weighted probability of being an undocumented immigrant. Estimates for all Spanish regions. 
  












     
    
After  0.027 -0.056 0.002 0.014 0.003 0.056 -0.129 -0.005 
  (0.97) (0.43) (0.98) (0.74) (0.98) (0.97) (0.95) (0.97) 
Undocumented* -0.048 0.047 -0.003 -0.033 -0.153 -0.225 -0.727 0.032 
After (0.91) (0.96) (0.97) (0.96) (0.37) (0.86) (0.68) (0.57) 
Constant 1.207*** -0.044 0.073* 1.117*** 0.355*** 9.758*** 6.800*** 0.069** 
 (0.00) (0.56) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) 
Nationality FE X X X X X X X X 
Region FE X X X X X X X X 
Time FE X X X X X X X X 
Region linear trends X X X X X X X X 
Individual Covariates X X X X X X X X 
Pre-reform mean 
outcome variable 0.721 0.318 0.114 0.748 0.376 7.281 6.577 0.010 
  




Observations 54,351 54,338 54,546 54,591 54,505 54,142 37,928 40,588 
R-squared 0.042 0.045 0.012 0.048 0.018 0.072 0.064 0.046 
 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level, Sidak p-values adjusted for multiple testing are shown in parenthesis. The regression also includes survey phase dummies (three per 
year). Individual covariates include dummies for age groups, dummies for highest level of education, gender and the level of regional unemployment. 






Table 10A. Weighted probability of being an undocumented immigrant. Estimates for more intensively treated Spanish regions. 
  












     
    
After  -0.070 0.050 -0.044 -0.031 -0.030 -0.165 0.377 -0.011 
  (0.91) (0.66) (0.66) (0.66) (0.30) (0.91) (0.78) (0.21) 
Undocumented* -0.065** -0.119*** -0.071 -0.059** -0.051 -0.215 -0.672** 0.005 
After (0.05) (0.01) (0.15) (0.05) (0.80) (0.15) (0.05) (0.40) 
Constant 1.169*** 0.385*** 0.111*** 1.158*** 0.074 10.453*** 5.568*** 0.012 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.60) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) 
Nationality FE X X X X X X X X 
Region FE X X X X X X X X 
Time FE X X X X X X X X 
Region linear trends X X X X X X X X 
Individual Covariates X X X X X X X X 
Pre-reform mean 
outcome variable 0.738 0.350 0.140 0.762 0.364 7.451 6.775 0.013 
         
Observations 17,732 17,731 17,785 17,797 17,768 17,633 12,313 13,278 
R-squared 0.043 0.043 0.014 0.049 0.018 0.059 0.060 0.031 
 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level, Sidak p-values adjusted for multiple testing are shown in parenthesis. The regression also includes survey phase dummies (three per 
year). Individual covariates include dummies for age groups, dummies for highest level of education, gender and the level of regional unemployment. 






Table 11A. Weighted probability of being an undocumented immigrant. Estimates for less intensively treated Spanish regions. 
  












     
    
After  0.031 -0.053 0.000 0.016 0.028 -0.003 -0.102 -0.010 
  (0.96) (0.67) (1.00) (0.89) (0.96) (1.00) (0.96) (0.88) 
Undocumented* 0.056 0.217 0.066 0.062 -0.240* -0.003 -0.244 0.066** 
After (0.92) (0.42) (0.92) (0.92) (0.07) (0.99) (0.95) (0.01) 
Constant 0.137*** 0.837*** 0.060** 1.111*** 0.333*** 6.741*** 6.974*** 0.058 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.12) 
Nationality FE X X X X X X X X 
Region FE X X X X X X X X 
Time FE X X X X X X X X 
Region linear trends X X X X X X X X 
Individual Covariates X X X X X X X X 
Pre-reform mean 
outcome variable 0.708 0.293 0.094 0.737 0.385 7.149 6.416 0.008 
 




Observations 36,619 36,607 36,761 36,794 36,737 36,509 25,615 27,310 
R-squared 0.044 0.048 0.013 0.048 0.019 0.077 0.068 0.054 
 
Note: Standard errors are clustered at the provincial level, Sidak p-values adjusted for multiple testing are shown in parenthesis. The regression also includes survey phase dummies (three per 
year). Individual covariates include dummies for age groups, dummies for highest level of education, gender and the level of regional unemployment. 









Figure 1A. CASES WHERE ENTITLED INDIVIDUALS WERE BANNED FROM ACCESS 
 
Source: REDER report, “Five myths for five years of health exclusion”, 2017 
 
